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1 Case Study / Bosnia-Herzegovina
To what extent was the conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina generated by lack 
of inclusion of a group or groups in the 
state’s political and legal structures? 
Was there a lack of human rights 
protection for the excluded group? 
Interpretations of the causes of conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina are highly contested. 
One interpretation highlights the struggle for 
control of state institutions between ruling 
elites of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY), following the death of its 
president, Josip Broz Tito in 1980. Nationalist 
entrepreneurs such as Slobodan Miloševic´ 
and Franjo Tudjman framed the struggle in 
terms of zero-sum ethnic competition, risks 
of becoming a minority group in a successor 
state dominated by other national interests, 
and historical experiences of inter-communal 
atrocities committed during the second world 
war (Benett 2016, 33–44; Gagnon 2006). To 
what extent the exclusion and precariousness 
of certain groups drove secession and conflict 
is debatable (see Bieber et al (eds) 2016; and 
Baker 2015). However, both domestic elites and 
international commentators manipulated or 
subscribed to narratives of fear and grievance 
between intractable national communities. 
Understanding the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
through this ethnic lens contributed to the 
priorities of the resulting peace process, 
which advocated solutions institutionalising 
ethnic identities and titular majorities of 
territorial entities. 
How did reform initiatives and various 
peace processes try to address this? 
Between 1992 and 1995, internationally 
mediated peace plans drew from Yugoslavia’s 
constitutions – which from 1946 established 
a federal system between titular constituent 
nations and rights for national minorities 
(Trbovich 2008, 153–70) – by proposing 
a power-sharing settlement between the 
Muslim/Bosniak,1 Croat and Serb communities. 
These plans increasingly subscribed to 
the belief that multi-ethnic democracy in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is impossible without 
institutionalised guarantees for the three 
main ethnic groups. The European Community 
Conference on Yugoslavia was succeeded 
by the International Conference on the 
Former Yugoslavia, which was tasked with 
negotiating a political settlement guaranteeing 
the rights of all national communities and 
minorities in an independent and recognised 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
As the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was a consequence of Yugoslavia’s wider 
dissolution, and recognising that the Serbian 
and Croatian governments were supporting 
ethnic political parties and armed actors, 
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the leaders of neighbouring countries 
were included in some of the negotiations, 
particularly the final talks at Dayton, US in 1995. 
Throughout the ensuing peace processes, the 
notion of a central state divided between three 
constituent peoples became the principle 
around which constitutional proposals were 
designed. Pushing for a power-sharing system 
from the outset, the main peace process also 
attempted to maintain the existence of a central 
Bosnian state that, as conflict escalated 
and ethnic cleansing dramatically changed, 
altered territorial demographics became less 
acceptable to the parties, either unwilling to 
rescind territorial gains and military victories, 
or to sign up to plans deemed as rewarding 
ethnic cleansing (Silber and Little 1995, 306–22). 
How did inclusion and protection 
of rights feature in the agreements, 
or constitutional and institutional 
reform approaches? 
The first proposal to divide Bosnia-
Herzegovina into a two-tier state of central 
institutions and sub-state units along ethnic 
lines was the Carrington-Cutileiro Plan of 
18 March 1992. It proposed “a state composed 
of three constituent units, based on national 
principles”, with “citizens of the Muslim, Serb 
and Croat nations and other nationalities” 
retaining sovereignty.2 
This notion of a Bosnian state divided both 
politically and territorially between Bosniaks, 
Serbs and Croats became a common feature 
of the major international plans throughout the 
peace process, from that time on, with more 
details on the ethnic allocation of positions 
and constitutional units provided by each 
subsequent agreement. The 1993 Vance-Owen 
plan provided for power-sharing at the state 
and sub-state levels in an interim capacity, 
which included: a nine-member presidency 
divided equally between each group; a rotating 
President of the presidency; interim provincial 
governments formed proportionally on 
the basis of the 1991 census, and veto rights 
on matters of vital concern to constituent 
peoples. These arrangements were envisaged 
as transitional towards a new negotiated 
constitution, “under which the role of the 
Presidency and the Government chosen 
from a democratically elected Parliament is 
expected to be different and will reflect more 
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accurately the will of the people”.3 However, 
the decentralisation of the Vance-Owen plan 
formed the backbone of future agreements, 
and as each peace plan was agreed and then 
rescinded by one or more party, these power-
sharing provisions became more complex 
and multi-layered.  
In July 1993 the Constitutional Agreement 
of the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan proposal 
drew on the Croat-Serb Constitutional 
Principles for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and moved 
from territorial power-sharing by province to 
a union of three constituent republics, with 
internationally governed interim districts 
for Sarajevo and Mostar. Positions in central 
institutions would be allocated proportionally 
and rotated between Muslims, Serbs and 
Croats. The number of proposed constituent 
republics dropped from three to two in March 
1994, when the Washington Agreement 
(or Contact Group plan) established a joint 
Bosniak-Croat federation, following a series 
of ceasefire agreements between the Army 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH) and the 
Croatian Defence Council (HVO) throughout 
1993 and 1994. This federation included 
a Bosniak-Croat shared central government 
and legislature, cantonal governments, and 
municipal governments. 
The question of Serb-majority territories 
remained unresolved until the Agreed Basic 
Principles at Geneva in September 1995, 
which established that Bosnia-Herzegovina 
would consist of proportionally divided 
central institutions, and two federal entities: 
the Bosniak-Croat constituent Federation 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina (FBiH) and the 
Serb constituent Republika Srpska (RS). 
This 51–49% principle forms the basis of 
the territorial power-sharing agreed on by 
parties to the General Framework Agreement 
for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, also 
known as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), 
a comprehensive agreement heralded for 
ending the war, but criticised for consolidating 
division and rewarding ethnic cleansing.
Comprised of an initial agreement and 
11 substantive annexes, including Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s current constitution (Annex 4), 
the DPA provides extensively for the inclusion 
and protection of rights for three constituent 
peoples: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. Those 
citizens who do not identify as such are 
excluded from many of the power-sharing 
mechanisms, while simultaneously guaranteed 
rights of equality, political participation, and 
non-discrimination. Many of the complex 
power-sharing mechanisms in the DPA were 
adapted from constitutional proposals in 
earlier peace plans. Key features include: 
a three-member, rotating presidency; an 
executive coalition; veto rights on matters of 
national interest; proportionality throughout 
most public institutions, including legislatures 
at central and entity levels; international 
involvement and oversight; territory divided 
into majority entities, cantons (in the FBiH) 
and municipalities; and the self-governing  
multi-ethnic district of Brc
v
ko.  
Annex 4 also contains the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms enjoyed by all 
citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Article II.3), 
and international human rights treaties to 
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be applied (Annex I), including conventions 
on the rights of national minorities. These 
instruments were previously incorporated 
and withdrawn from earlier peace plans, 
depending on different rationales of parties 
and negotiators, including the importance 
for citizens to have rights explicitly listed, 
and the time constraints of writing and 
re-writing constitutional proposals during 
peace talks (Szasz 1996, 306–7). Article II.4 
of the constitution affirms equal enjoyment 
of these rights without discrimination, a 
commitment that plaintiffs at the European 
Court of Human Rights have used in cases 
against the state, regarding the right to political 
participation of minorities and non-ethnic 
citizens. Crucially, Article II.2 stipulates that 
the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
“shall have priority over all other law”.  
Beyond the constitution, the Agreement 
on Human Rights (Annex 6) contains further 
mechanisms to protect rights, establishing 
a Human Rights Commission consisting of 
an Office of the Ombudsman and a Human 
Rights Chamber. The Chamber is staffed using 
a combination of proportionality between 
the entities and international involvement, 
with the initial Ombudsman appointed by the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE). The Agreement on Refugees 
and Displaced Persons (Annex 7) provides 
extensively for the right to return and to 
reclaim property. 
How did the peace or reform 
process approach inclusivity: 
did it focus just on the dominant 
groups at the heart of the 
conflict? To what extent did it 
also attempt broader inclusion 
of other groups and interests?  
The peace process for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
entirely focused on the demands of three 
dominant parties to the conflict. Each round 
of negotiations and peace plans addressed 
the interests of Bosniak, Croat and Serb armed 
T
h
e 
D
ay
to
n
 P
ea
ce
 A
cc
o
rd
s 
in
 P
ar
is
, 1
4
 D
ec
em
b
er
 1
9
9
5 
/ ©
 U
.S
. A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
/W
ik
im
ed
ia
 C
o
m
m
o
n
s
5 Case Study / Bosnia-Herzegovina
actors or political parties, to the exclusion 
of “others” or non-aligned minorities. This 
reflects the fact that representatives of other 
interest groups – displaced persons, women, 
Roma, Jews, other non-aligned minorities – 
were mostly excluded from the peace talks, 
and that agreements were signed only by 
representatives of the Bosniaks, Croats, 
Serbs, heads of neighbouring republics, 
and international actors.  
 These “others” are mentioned infrequently 
in several peace agreements prior to the 
DPA, sometimes receiving guaranteed 
representation in institutions, such as one 
of the four ombudspersons proposed by 
the Owen-Stoltenberg agreement, or the 
16 reserved seats of the Mostar City Council 
in the DPA on Implementing the FBiH. 
However, these allocations eventually only 
existed at the federation level legislature, 
and other institutional arrangements, such 
as the rotating presidency or the tripartite 
body of ombudspersons, require candidates 
to identify as one of the three constituent 
peoples. Therefore, “others” do not enjoy the 
same rights to political participation as those 
who identify as Bosniak, Croat, or Serb. This 
exclusion has proved problematic in the two 
decades since the agreement was signed, and 
has led to several legal challenges regarding 
the agreement’s additional commitments 
to equality and non-discrimination.  
Women were almost invisible in both the 
peace process and the agreement texts. Of the 
113 peace agreements signed regarding Bosnia-
Herzegovina,4 none were signed by anyone 
explicitly acting on behalf of women’s groups 
or interests. A female representative of a party 
to the conflict signed only one agreement,5 
and four other agreements list women as 
observers, chairpersons, or representatives of 
humanitarian organisations and neighbouring 
states.6 Regarding content, approximately 
10% of the agreements refer to women, girls 
and gender issues. These are predominantly 
references to humanitarian protection, or 
inclusion of international conventions such as 
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 
appendices of human rights instruments to be 
incorporated into a future constitution.  
Local or de facto minorities – those 
who became members of minority groups 
in entities, cantons or municipalities – were 
mainly provided for in Annex 7 of the DPA. This 
annex aimed to reverse the territorial results 
of ethnic cleansing through guaranteeing the 
right to return, reclaim property, and receive 
protection, all of which was hoped would 
encourage the “re-mixing of peoples” (Brubaker 
2013). If successful, however, the mechanisms 
for return would result in some sub-state 
entities becoming more heterogeneous, 
directly challenging the reliance on ethno-
territorial federalism and complex systems 
of majority representatives of entities. Under 
the current constitution, a Bosniak or Croat 
returnee to the RS cannot run to be the entity’s 
member of the state presidency – likewise for 
Serb returnees to the FBiH – as citizens must 
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6 Case Study / Bosnia-Herzegovina
identify as the titular nationality of the entity 
they reside in to stand for office as a member 
of the presidency.7  
What were the critical moments 
when attempts at inclusion could 
have succeeded (and did not) or 
failed (and did not)? What factors 
– in country leadership, civil society 
mobilisation and international 
intervention – determined whether 
they succeeded or failed? 
The initial Carrington-Cutileiro plan, as the 
first agreement to produce a vision of the new 
constitutional arrangements, was a chance to 
propose a plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina that 
was not over-reliant on the use of nationality 
to define territorial units and institutional 
composition. However, the “negotiators 
accepted the political realities on the ground” 
that the three main ethnic parties in Bosnia-
Herzegovina were bargaining to control 
territory, and relying on the dominance of 
the ethnic conflict narrative (Greenberg 
and McGuiness 2000, 45). The plan also 
proposed a directly elected chamber of 
citizens, and mechanisms to protect human 
rights and rights of minorities; however, it 
was the concept of constituent peoples 
and majorities that became entrenched in 
the peace process. While initially accepted 
by all three parties, it was later rejected by 
the Bosnian presidency. 
Another critical moment of opportunity 
for securing a more inclusive settlement was 
the failed Vance-Owen peace plan in 1993. 
Although it institutionalised ethnicity in a 
weak, decentralised state, the plan explicitly 
stated the transitional nature of the ethnic 
state structures, before democratic elections 
would lead to a more majoritarian system of 
governance. Belligerents agreed to different 
parts of the plan over several months of 
international mediation; however, the Bosnian 
Serb signature was conditional on the approval 
of the Assembly of the Republika Srpska, 
who ultimately rejected it.  
How transformative has the 
process been on the inclusion 
front? If not transformative now, 
were there transformative 
moments, or is there further 
transformative potential? 
Inclusion and protection of different identity 
groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina – be they 
constituent peoples, “others”, non-ethnic 
citizens, or de facto minorities – is still 
a contentious and unresolved issue. Due to 
the fragmented nature of the state and inherent 
contradictions of the DPA, there has been 
limited transformation of the exclusiveness 
of the current state structures, despite 
numerous attempts to challenge or reverse 
this institutionalised ethnicity. 
Multiple attempts to reconfigure 
exclusive structures at different levels of 
state governance have proved either difficult 
to implement once reformed (Bieber 2006, 
108–43), or have subsequently violated the 
constitution. The most prominent of these 
has been the case of Sejdic' and Finci v Bosnia-
Herzegovina at the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), which in 2009 ruled that 
their ineligibility to stand for election to the 
House of Peoples and the presidency – as 
members of the Roma and Jewish communities 
respectively – violates their right to freedom 
from discrimination (ECtHR 2009).
Other cases have followed: Zornic' v Bosnia-
Herzegovina (2014) on the right to political 
participation as a non-ethnically affiliated 
citizen; and Pilav v Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(2016) on the right to stand for election 
to the presidency as a representative of 
an entity where one is de facto minority. 
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These judgments remain unenforced, as 
constituent politicians are reluctant to pass 
de-ethnic reforms which would reduce their 
consolidation of power and benefit from the 
status quo (Gordy 2015, 611–22). Following 
the decision of the Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
Constitutional Court regarding the 
“Constituent Peoples” case in 2000, the Court 
has repeatedly made rulings in line with the 
ECtHR judgments, to little effect.  
Furthermore, pushes for non-discrimination 
and minority inclusion raise the spectre of 
opportunistic ethnic entrepreneurs’ calls for 
further fragmentation of the state, such as 
using the recent Constitutional Court ruling 
on equality and electoral reform to push for 
a third, Croat-majority entity (Rose 2016). 
Anticipated reform resulting from Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s beleaguered accession process 
to the European Union has also failed to 
materialise, as the process has slowly remained 
on track despite failure to implement the 
Sejdic' -Finci and other ECtHR judgments. 
Calls for greater inclusion of women have 
mainly come from civil society activists, with 
limited gains, although Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
National Action Plan to implement United 
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1325 was launched in 2013 (Action Plan). 
The human rights provisions in the DPA 
which are listed in what can be described 
as an “international friendly” constitution, 
could be critiqued for simply tacking on 
international human rights standards to one 
particular context. However, the inclusion of 
the European Convention on Human Rights in 
the constitution can also be viewed as a “tool 
that gives a concrete language to human rights 
in the domestic sphere” (Ni Aolain 2001, 63–4). 
During the negotiation processes, there were 
concerns that reiterating established rights 
such as the right to life would be interpreted as 
too similar to previous Yugoslav constitutional 
rights, and thus be mistrusted due to failure to 
protect such basic rights; simultaneously, as 
SFRY had been a party to almost all UN human 
rights treaties, there was already a precedence 
for inclusion of international human rights 
standards (Szasz 1996, 306–7). 
Therefore, the difficulty in implementing 
human rights protections is not due to an 
inability to translate international norms 
into a domestic context, but is more a result 
of the fundamental contradiction between 
a power-sharing constitution which enshrines 
institutional discrimination based on proscribed 
ethno-national identity, and human rights 
mechanisms which guarantee rights to non-
discrimination and equality. While the supposed 
enforcement mechanisms or safeguards in 
the power-sharing constitutional framework 
to promote non-ethnic reform (such as 
international involvement or the superiority 
of the European Convention on Human Rights 
over all other law) continue to fail, international 
human rights standards remain ineffective.
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Endnotes
1 In 1993 the Second Bosniak Congress agreed 
to move from the use of the term “Muslim” to 
“Bosniak”; therefore throughout this section 
“Bosniak” will be used, unless a peace agreement 
has used the term “Muslim”.
2 Statement of Principles for New Constitutional 
Arrangements for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
18 March 1992, see A. Independence, 1 and 3.
3 See Annex 1.A. Interim Presidency and Interim 
Central Government, 1. Agreement on Interim 
Arrangements, Vance-Owen Plan, 2 May 1993.
4 Number recorded as of 12 January 2017.  
PA-X, Peace Agreements Database,  
www.peaceagreements.org
5 Biljana Plavšic´ signed the Agreement on 
a ceasefire in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 
8 May 1992 ‘for the Serbian side’. At the 
time Plavšic' was part of the three-member 
presidency of the self-declared Serb 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 Ms. Olga Lazic´-D- erd- , for the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, 1 October 1992; Mrs. A. M. 
Demmer, Director, Regional Office for Europe 
and America, United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees, 1 October 1992, 6 June 1992; 
Iris Wittwer, Head of Delegation, ICRC Zenica, 
30 January 1993; and Mrs. Ogata, United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
18 November 1993 (titled as signed).  
7 Article V Presidency, Annex 4: Constitution, 
General Framework Agreement for Peace 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 21 November 1995. 
9 Case Study / Bosnia-Herzegovina
References
Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 
1325 in Bosnia-Herzegovina 2014-2017.  
Available at: www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp- 
content/uploads/2014/12/BiH-NAP-ENG.pdf 
Baker C. (2015) The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Benett C. (2016) Bosnia’s Paralysed Peace. 
London: C. Hurst & Co.
Bieber F. (2006) Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, 
Inequality, and Public Sector Governance. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bieber F., Galijaš A. and Archer R. (eds) (2016) Debating 
the End of Yugoslavia. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Brubaker R. (2013) “From the unmixing to the 
remixing of peoples: UNHCR and minority returns 
in Bosnia”. New Issues in Refugee Research, 
Research Paper No. 261 (August). Available at: 
www.unhcr.org/uk/research/working/520a4ccf9/
unmixing-remixing-peoples-unhcr-minority-returns-
bosnia-rebecca-brubaker
European Court of Human Rights (2009) Judgment 
in case of Sejdic' and Finci vs. Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
22 December. Available at: hudoc.echr.coe.int/
webservices/content/pdf/001-96491?TID=igauxmghdq
Gagnon Jr. V.P. (2006) The Myth of Ethnic War. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Gordy E. (2015) “Dayton’s Annex 4 Constitution at 
20: Political Stalemate, Public Dissatisfaction and the 
Rebirth of Self-organisation”. Southeast European 
and Black Sea Studies, 15 (4).
Greenberg M.C. and McGuinness M.E. (2000) 
“From Lisbon to Dayton: International Mediation 
and the Bosnia Crisis”. In Greenberg M.C., Barton 
J.H. and McGuinness M.E. (eds) Words Over War: 
Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict. 
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Ni Aolain F. (2001) “The Fractured Soul of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis”. In Sokolovi 
D. and Bieber F. (eds), Reconstructing Multiethnic 
Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Aldershot: Ashgate.
Rose E. (2016) “Bosnian Court Ruling Lends Weight 
to Croat Agitation”. Balkan Insight, 15 December. 
Available at: www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/
bosnian-court-ruling-spells-constitutional-trouble-
say-experts-12-14-2016
Silber L. and Little A. (1995) The Death of Yugoslavia. 
London: Penguin Books.
Szasz P. (1996) “The Protection of Human Rights 
Through the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement on 
Bosnia”. The American Journal of International 
Law, 90 (2).
Trbovich A. (2008) A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia’s 
Disintegration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and are not necessarily endorsed by the British Academy, but are 
commended as contributing to public debate.
